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Towards Trustworthy AI-Empowered Real-Time Bidding for Online Advertisement Auctioning

Tang, Xiaoli, Yu, Han

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Artificial intelligence-empowred Real-Time Bidding (AIRTB) is regarded as one of the most enabling technologies for online advertising. It has attracted significant research attention from diverse fields such as pattern recognition, game theory and mechanism design. Despite of its remarkable development and deployment, the AIRTB system can sometimes harm the interest of its participants (e.g., depleting the advertisers' budget with various kinds of fraud). As such, building trustworthy AIRTB auctioning systems has emerged as an important direction of research in this field in recent years. Due to the highly interdisciplinary nature of this field and a lack of a comprehensive survey, it is a challenge for researchers to enter this field and contribute towards building trustworthy AIRTB technologies. This paper bridges this important gap in trustworthy AIRTB literature. We start by analysing the key concerns of various AIRTB stakeholders and identify three main dimensions of trust building in AIRTB, namely security, robustness and fairness. For each of these dimensions, we propose a unique taxonomy of the state of the art, trace the root causes of possible breakdown of trust, and discuss the necessity of the given dimension. This is followed by a comprehensive review of existing strategies for fulfilling the requirements of each trust dimension. In addition, we discuss the promising future directions of research essential towards building trustworthy AIRTB systems to benefit the field of online advertising.


An Efficient Deep Distribution Network for Bid Shading in First-Price Auctions

Zhou, Tian, He, Hao, Pan, Shengjun, Karlsson, Niklas, Shetty, Bharatbhushan, Kitts, Brendan, Gligorijevic, Djordje, Gultekin, San, Mao, Tingyu, Pan, Junwei, Zhang, Jianlong, Flores, Aaron

arXiv.org Machine Learning

Since 2019, most ad exchanges and sell-side platforms (SSPs), in the online advertising industry, shifted from second to first price auctions. Due to the fundamental difference between these auctions, demand-side platforms (DSPs) have had to update their bidding strategies to avoid bidding unnecessarily high and hence overpaying. Bid shading was proposed to adjust the bid price intended for second-price auctions, in order to balance cost and winning probability in a first-price auction setup. In this study, we introduce a novel deep distribution network for optimal bidding in both open (non-censored) and closed (censored) online first-price auctions. Offline and online A/B testing results show that our algorithm outperforms previous state-of-art algorithms in terms of both surplus and effective cost per action (eCPX) metrics. Furthermore, the algorithm is optimized in run-time and has been deployed into VerizonMedia DSP as production algorithm, serving hundreds of billions of bid requests per day. Online A/B test shows that advertiser's ROI are improved by +2.4%, +2.4%, and +8.6% for impression based (CPM), click based (CPC), and conversion based (CPA) campaigns respectively.